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Abstract
This article examines nation-building in relation to education and educational 
institutions, taking two former big players in European politics in the wake of the 
First World War as examples: the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire. The 
Habsburg Empire is examined by focusing particularly on textbooks around and after 
1918, comparing them with each other and understanding them as major tools for 
spreading national ideas within state school. As will be shown, the idea of an Austrian 
nation can hardly be found, neither before nor immediately after the break of 1918, 
in the sense of the ideology of a nation-state. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire 
is being examined as an example for doing nation in a process of transformation of 
social structures within non-western societies through western-style schools, thus 
contributing to nationally substantiating the Republic of Turkey. This article examines 
the imperial foundations of these two nation-states and how they and the preceding 
empires dealt with the modern concept of nation and nationalism.
Key words: Austria; Habsburg Empire; nation-building; Ottoman Empire; Turkey.
Introduction
The year 1918 saw not only the end of the First World War, but also „The Age of 
Empire“ and with it the so-called “long nineteenth century” (Hobsbawm, 1989, p. 
6). Eventually, the old European empires ceased to exist and were replaced by plenty 
of newly constructed nation-states on their former territories. In the struggle for 
a dominant cultural thesis about commonality and togetherness, the ideology of 
nationalism gained more and more intelligibility throughout the nineteenth century 
and eventually ruled out the imperial structures by the end of the First World War: 
the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy could not 
assert themselves against the ideology of nationalism. Within these nation-building 
processes, the enforcement of mass education played a crucial role and a centralized 
and standardized education system became a sine qua non (Tröhler, 2020), as has been 
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carefully researched for several nation-states, e.g. France (Weber, 1979; Harp, 1998). 
The fusion of a nation as a cultural thesis of a “we“ with the political power structure 
of a modern state creates a symbiosis of mutual reinforcement. Whereas the nation 
finally gains the administrative and organizational means to promote, and especially, 
to reproduce its dominant cultural thesis, the state gains legitimization for the exercise 
of power by citizens identifying themselves with this national “we“. Schooling plays a 
crucial role within this symbiosis since it displays the site where the state provides the 
institutional basis for the fabrication of the national citizen, being able to “read“ and 
understand the national symbols, rituals and beliefs. The successful amalgamation of 
nation and state within the last 200 years has rendered the construct of a nation-state 
so natural, making usage of the in fact different terms of nation, state, and nation-
state nearly interchangeable. However, looking into the cases of the Ottoman as well as 
Habsburg Empires points out that, back in history, strong states, not within a national, 
but within an imperial context existed, uniting different cultural theses about belonging, 
inclusion, and exclusion within a shared territory. Therefore, this article offers a view of 
history that may seem strange in today‘s seemingly natural logic of the nation-state by 
tracing vanished models of two multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-denominational 
empires, that had (at least originally) strong state structures. Although the two cases 
have a strong state in common, their paths towards a singular national identity were 
quite different; for example, one managed to exist until the 1920s, refusing to merge 
into one particular national identity. Yet, both cases were also consistent in that their 
different development paths depended on their bourgeois elites.
Therefore, the aim of this article is to shed light on the interconnection of nation-
building and education in imperial contexts. In order to do this, we understand 
nationalism according to Özkırımlı as a kind of discourse that has to be reproduced 
constantly to gain intelligibility and a kind of naturalness, thereby turning it into 
something that is taken for granted (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp. 206-217). We further draw 
on the conceptual approaches regarding “nation“, “nation-states“, “state“ and “doing 
nation“ that were proposed in the introduction of this issue (see article by Daniel 
Tröhler, in this issue). Rather than being a case study based on own archival research, 
this article wants to elucidate how imperial state functionings and societies altered 
successively in the course of the long nineteenth century by travelling ideas. Since 
we rely methodically on discourse-analytical research literature we subscribe to this 
methodology by conducting a content analysis of that literature.  In order to do so we 
want to proceed in three steps: first, we want to unravel the nationalized perception of 
empires by setting out imperial state-society relations. Then, we want to look into how 
these imperial functionings were contested considering the ideology of nationalism. 
Thirdly, we want to pin down the performativity of the concept of nationalism while 
looking into how, and especially in which social spaces the identity, spatial, and historical 
claims (Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 51) emerged and developed within the Ottoman Empire 
and the Habsburg Empire.
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Nation-states vs. empire-states
Research based on the modernization paradigm often renders imperial models as 
ancient, pre-modern and traditional, describing them as ill-suited and not viable in 
an industrialized and modern world (Ahmad, 1993). Regarding the Ottoman Empire, 
Olivier Bouquet gave a detailed overview about such research culminating in a doxa 
according to which modernization can be equated to westernization that cannot 
be achieved except by modernizing state institutions (Bouquet, 2015). The related 
epistemology of development creates a binary construction of modern-developed-
industrialized versus premodern-undeveloped-agrarian, whereas the model of an 
empire is ascribed to the latter in order to diagnose its condition and thus any need 
for action (Lewis, 2002a; Lewis, 2002b). Therefore, the emergence of nationalism and 
hence also of nation-states is often regarded as and researched in terms of fulfilling 
a natural, inevitable and sound path towards progress. But, as research has shown, 
different contexts create different sorts of nationalisms (Özkırımlı, 2010). In some cases, 
belonging to a nation refers more to a common spoken language, as it is in France; in 
other cases, ethnicity is coming to the forefront, like in Germany; and in yet another 
case, it is a shared history and political attitude, like in Switzerland. The emphasis 
placed on one of these elements is changeable throughout time. For instance, Finnish 
nationalism first relied on language to emphasize its separateness from Sweden, but 
afterwards, to cut itself off from Russian influence, a political vision was emphasized 
(Ichijo, 2013, p. 70). Nevertheless, the ability to connect to already existing cultural, 
linguistic, and ethnic bonds seems to be inevitable in the formation of nations (Smith, 
2009). So, what could the cultural theses of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires 
have been since they were multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-denominational? To 
answer this question apart from modernization theories, we firstly want to separate 
the terms of state and nation from each other. Veronika Maricic has shown that the 
presupposed synthesis of nation and state does not work for the Scottish case (see article 
by Veronika Maricic, in this issue), challenging the fusion that has become as natural 
and self-evident as the concept of nationalism itself (Tröhler, 2020). This “nationalist 
perception” (Tröhler, 2020, p. 4) of the state obstructed the view on empires in the 
long nineteenth century. These empires had indeed strong state systems, constituting 
an important context for shaping everything that followed. Both of the investigated 
empires had indeed been strong imperial states linked to not just one particular nation 
but many different nations.
From the very beginning, the Ottoman state named itself “Devlet-i Aliyye,” which 
means nothing other than “The Sublime State” (Inalcik, 2014). The fact that even the 
Ottoman dynasty referenced their legitimacy to a state system shows the importance 
and meaning of this power structure. The traditionally strong attachment of Ottoman 
officials to their devlet (state) provided the basis for the development of different 
cultural theses about belonging and togetherness in the nineteenth century, ranging 
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from Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism (Mardin, 1997, p. 117). On the way from 
empire to nation-state, it was exactly this existence of the empire-made “state-society” 
to which the republican founding fathers could resort (Meeker, 2001, p. 13). Ottoman 
governance techniques were shaped by a highly diversified population on a vast territory 
comprising European, Asian, and African lands, and with a long Byzantine-Greek-
ruled history. Within its territory, the Ottoman state united Muslims from different 
cultural backgrounds, as well as Orthodox Armenians and Greeks, not to forget a 
Jewish minority. The fact that 40% of the Ottoman population around 1880 consisted 
of non-Muslims shows the rootedness and long-term experience of a multi-ethnic 
empire (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 240). The Ottoman Empire had in fact three societal 
arenas: the decentralized millet system, the Ottoman household system, and the four 
social-economic “estates” (Karpat, 2002, p. 330) that existed beyond religious identities.
The first arena was the millet system through which the Ottoman state tried to organize 
its above-mentioned heterogeneity. It was a system that was based on a commonly 
shared economic, social and political ground, while still preserving religious and 
ethno-cultural identity within the different millet groups. This blend of shared socio-
economic fields in conjunction with separated identities “Ottomanized” its society in 
a certain way. This circumstance was difficult to classify for Western observers, then 
just as now, as Kemal Karpat (2001) stated:
It is quite understandable, therefore, why Westerners who traveled through the 
Ottoman domains in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found sharp 
differences of customs, language, and religion among various regions and 
communities, but also observed that they were similar in economic, social and 
political outlook. (p. 617)
Michael Meeker also found, during his historiographic and ethnographic research 
on the north-eastern coast of Turkey, that Islamic sociability constituted the frame 
within which the heterogeneous imperial society had acted and felt attached to each 
other as well as to the Ottoman state (Meeker, 2001, p. 74). But how should one 
imagine this imperial state diverging from our national framed understanding? Until 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the state had not been acting in a center-
periphery logic. This logic categorizes the strength of state influence according to a 
centers’ direct access to the peripheries, thus rendering strong provincial powers as a 
possible outcome of a weak central government (Meeker, 2001). Rather, the center and 
the periphery were connected through a hub-and-spoke network, negotiating across 
cultures and social formations “by focusing on the multivalent, networked, vertical, and 
horizontal linkages and the malleable compacts established between state and social 
actors” (Barkey, 2008, p. 6). In this way, the Ottomans construed a form of governance 
that combined centralism and regionalism, consistency and flexibility of boundaries 
as well as the integration and toleration of diversity and dissent (Barkey, 2008, p. 29), 
thus incorporating semi- and unofficial local oligarchies, provincial nobles and social 
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networks. Benjamin Gourisse stated that this hybrid specificity of the Ottoman state 
was and still is misinterpreted in terms of analyzing its functioning since most research 
overlooks that “the imperial system thus constitutes a ‘feedback loop between societies 
[…] and institutions,’ operating in a rhizomatic fashion” (Gourisse, 2015, p. 9).
To avoid misleading interpretations of Ottoman history being captured in a certain 
linguistic, and thus epistemological frame, Marc Aymes proposes using indigenous 
words in order to understand another social and political reality not necessarily 
corresponding with our own (Aymes, 2015, p. 30). Following this proposal, the Ottoman 
household system has to be mentioned as the second arena, since it was this specific 
organizational structure of Ottoman society that contributed to a different state-society 
relation from the founding in the fourteenth century until the beginning of the long 
nineteenth century. The household system constituted the power and reproduction 
site of the empire, whereby the sultanic household displayed a template for Ottoman 
governors, nobles, and officials.
It focuses on the sultan’s household as the basic organizational unit of Ottoman 
society, a unit that cuts across formal institutional and class boundaries and 
contains within it the diverse activities of economic production, religious 
observance, political administration, and domestic affairs. This household, 
ranging in size from a hundred to thousands of members symbolically residing 
under one roof, comprises kin, retainers, and servants, all drawn from different 
segments of society. (Göcek, 1996, p. 18)
The third societal arena was the division of socio-economics into four estates (rulers, 
scribes, merchants, peasants) regardless of faith: there was no differentiation between 
a Muslim peasant and a Christian one, they were both part of the same estate.  This 
societal structure avoided the emergence of an inherited aristocracy able to accumulate 
great wealth and thereby challenge the state and was instead meritocratic in its origins 
(Karpat, 2001, p. 311).
However, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, imperial state 
policies founded on decentralization and diversity came under heavy pressure and 
could no longer maintain the social differentiation of its millet nor its household 
structure. Due to a mixture of macro historical reasons like the influx of capitalism 
(Erimtan, 2008, p. 48), which especially increased the social mobility of non-Muslim 
lay people; war; the inflow of Muslim refugees from Russia as well as the rumbling 
Balkans (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 115), the Ottoman government looked to the West for 
political solutions. The standardization and accumulation of power in the center mixed 
with a capitalist logic (Keyder, 1997, p. 33) observed in their European neighbors were 
regarded as successful tracks towards strengthening the state (Barkey, 2008, p. 265). 
Formerly based on differentiation and plurality, the Ottoman state began to opt for 
centralization and homogenization as the 1829 clothing regulation of Sultan Mahmud 
II made evident. According to this regulation, former clothing laws demarcating social 
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groups regarding occupation, rank, or religious affiliation were abolished, whereas a 
uniform for state officials was determined.  A telling circumstance was that the new 
state servants’ look – a fez (Ottoman headgear) combined with a European suit – 
became the norm for all male subjects (Quataert, 2005, p. 144).
Similarly, the Habsburg Empire – for centuries, the direct neighbour and rival of 
the Ottoman Empire – can be seen as a strong state, either as a confederation or as 
a federal state. Austria-Hungary (1867-1918) succeeded the Austrian Empire (1804-
1867) that was itself the heritage of the Holy Roman Empire, which was dissolved 
in 1806 by its last emperor, Franz II.  Franz dissolved the empire because he feared 
that Napoleon, who had crowned himself Emperor of the French in 1804, would try 
to conquer the Holy Roman Empire and make himself the emperor of it. First and 
foremost, Napoleon, together with his regime, spread the idea of nationalism across 
Europe, leading to several German states defecting from the empire (Vocelka, 2000, pp. 
170-172). Habsburg possessions contained peoples of various languages and cultural 
backgrounds after the recapture of south-eastern European territories from the Ottoman 
Empire in the aftermath of the failed Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683. The reforms of 
Maria Theresia in the middle of the eighteenth century helped to develop a modern, 
strong, centralized state with Vienna as its capital and royal residence. These reforms 
also included various innovations in the educational system, like the introduction of 
compulsory basic schooling for girls and boys in 1774 (Vocelka, 2000, pp. 158-160). In 
that sense, the modernized and relatively centralized state was not less multi-ethnic, 
multi-denominational, and multi-lingual than the Ottoman Empire. Compulsory basic 
education was provided in the local language (e.g. Czech, Polish, German, Hungarian, 
etc.) which made it effective but difficult to control by the ministry. Thus, the originally 
Swiss-native House of Habsburg was obliged to use the German language and culture, 
but multi-lingualism was a matter of course for the members of the House, the 
nobility, and bourgeoisie, and rather widespread. Emperor Joseph II (1741/65-1790) 
advanced German as the official language for administration, primarily in the service 
of centralizing the state. But within a few years after that, the French Revolution and 
the Coalition Wars swept away France’s Ancien Régime; and in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Germany and Italy became nation-states to the disadvantage of 
the Austrian Habsburgs. It seemed that the Age of Empires was over and the “Age of 
Nation-states” had become the model for politically organizing the life of peoples. 
Towards 1900, three of the multi-ethnic European empires remained, but struggled as 
entities: the Habsburg Empire, the Russian (Tsarist) Empire, and the Ottoman Empire.
This was when the role of language and ethnicity started to shift: people started 
to think of themselves as speakers of distinct languages and members of distinct 
nationalities. The December Constitution of 1867 (valid for the Empire except Hungary) 
guaranteed Austrian citizenship, freedom of speech, and freedom of press, and was in 
fact so modern that these laws on the rights of citizens are still in force. Considering 
the circumstances of free speech and a free press, authorities were faced with two very 
157
Croatian Journal of Education, Vol.22; Sp.Ed.No.2-2020, pages: 151-169
popular movements within the empire: the Hungarian struggle for independence and 
Pan-Slavism. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 was a concession to the 
Hungarians who had started to emancipate themselves from the Austrian Empire and 
wanted to eliminate foreign influence on their own terms. The Compromise created 
the state of Austria-Hungary on a legal basis and guaranteed the Hungarians their 
own parliament, their own representatives, and their own government.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Slavs in the Habsburg Empire (Slovenes, 
Croats and Serbs) had started to feel suppressed by the omnipresence of German (and 
Hungarian in the Hungarian half) in bureaucracy, administration, and higher education 
(e.g. universities). Only compulsory education was provided in the local languages, 
which led to discontent amongst Slavic members in the empire. Pan-Slavism gained 
popularity amongst many Slavic inhabitants who wanted equality with the Hungarian 
and Austrian halves of the empire. A culmination of this uprising conflict was the 
so-called Badeni-crisis of 1897, which is important to mention because it indicates a 
process of nationalization within the empire, thus illustrating what Hobsbawm meant 
with the end of the “Age of Empire” (1989). In 1897, the Austrian prime minister, Count 
Badeni, declared that Czech would, like German, be an official language within the 
inner administration of Bohemia. Czech had already been an official language for the 
outer service, e.g. citizens had the right to get help in their own native language, and it 
was already a standardized literary language in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, 
Badeni declared that, in the future, only those who spoke both German and Czech 
fluently could serve as clerks in Bohemia. This was not a problem for the clerks of 
Bohemian origin since most of them grew up bilingual anyway. Protests came from 
the German-speaking clerks who feared that they would lose their predominance. 
Riots erupted and were so severe that even martial law had to be declared. By the 
end of 1897, Count Badeni resigned from office and his language decree was later 
repealed, leaving Czechs as well as Germans disappointed (Vocelka, 2000, pp. 248-
250). Unexpectedly, the political elites had to deal with the fact that people were no 
longer satisfied with serving the emperor and the empire. They wanted to express 
themselves as members of different national societies under the common rule of the 
House of Habsburg. This is the context within which the advancement of the nation-
state concept in Austria in the following decades can be understood.
Bourgeois elite, educational borrowings, 
and doing nation
Based on the concept of “doing gender” (Butler, 1993), wherein a gender identity is 
socially constructed through actions and language (Gildemeister, 2008), we understand 
national identity also as a social construction. In examining the actions and language 
that construes a national identity on a daily and institutional basis, a new and very 
influential category of understanding and seeing the world with its values, rules, and 
standards is created. Understanding doing nation as a performative act indicates the 
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question about the people and the spaces wherein a certain understanding of the 
world is constructed through constantly repeating speech, non-verbal, and symbolic 
communication. Without these spaces, construing communication and normalizing 
a certain political practice, namely the nation, could not develop. In the case of doing 
gender, these spaces seem to be as old as humanity itself, whereas the construct of the 
nation-state is barely older than 200 years, raising the issue of how these spaces have 
been opened up in different contexts. The discourse about nationalism researched in 
European contexts has been overwhelmingly described as an elite discourse. More 
than only elite, the idea of nationalism seems to be intertwined with a certain social 
class: the bourgeoisie (Hechter, 1975). Hechter’s work about internal colonialism 
and the anglicization of the Celtic fringe showed how new bourgeois communities 
emerged from British political, economic, and cultural incentives by imitating the 
social stratification of the center and hence restructuring the whole society (Hechter, 
1975). It is also remarkable that the decline of empires, the emergence of nation-states, 
and the spread of a global bourgeoisie have occurred in parallel, namely during the 
twentieth century and both the nation-state and a bourgeois class formation derived 
from Western Europe (Dejung et al., 2019, p. 2). The case of the Ottoman Empire opens 
up an imperial, non-Western context to understand how the ideology of nationalism 
and a specific social stratum are connected and dependent on one another, and 
furthermore, how education was linked to the creation of that social stratum.
The case of the Ottoman Empire
To render the idea of a nation intelligible, new spaces had to be developed, and 
indeed, they were, to a large extent by educational institutions. The ways in which 
Ottoman society was absorbing ideas during the long nineteenth century coming 
foremost from Western Europe (Shaw & Shaw, 1977) deserve special attention, as 
well as how a certain transformation of local structures was needed precisely for this 
absorption.  At the same time, “these structures were shaped by, and often the result 
of, highly uneven power relations,” for instance, “imperialism and the emergence of a 
global economy that was increasingly dominated by Western Europe during the long 
nineteenth century” (Dejung et al., 2019, p. 4).  It is here that “the rise of middle classes 
in Asian and African colonies was undoubtedly fueled by European imperialism, 
yet their emergence was shaped not only by Western influences but also by local 
conditions” (Dejung et al., 2019, p. 4). Within the Ottoman context, we can observe 
a tentative edging towards a changed society. The worldwide circulation of people, 
ideas, and goods (Dejung et al., 2019, p. 2) became institutionalized in the Ottoman 
Empire through “policy-useful knowledge” (Cowen, 2011).
Educational institutions – the first so-called secular schools – found their way into 
Ottoman society through military borrowings as early as in the 1830s. The Ottomans, 
aware of their military defeats against the Russians and the accompanying territorial 
losses, searched for best practices to reform their military and render it competitive 
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again against the European powers. Influenced by the convincing victories in the 
1820s by the Egyptian governor Muhammad Ali, who reorganized his provincial army 
with French consultation, the military reforms of Sultan Mahmud II also followed 
the French model (Reed, 1951) and was later supplemented by Prussian elements. 
In the course of Prussian counselling, first by the famous Prussian general Heinrich 
von Moltke between 1836-1839, and later in the 1880s by field marshal Colmar von 
der Goltz (Osterrieder, 2016, p. 60), military academies and curricula were adopted 
by the Ottoman government, underpinning the coupling of military and education 
within the formation of national minds (Boser, 2016, p. 5). Political movements like 
the Young Ottomans and later on the Young Turks consisted of people who had been 
educated in these new institutions – a new elite, ready to absorb and reproduce the 
ideology of nationalism (Mardin, 1997, p. 117). Even if nationalistic sentiments were 
not the exclusive reaction of those graduates (Fortna, 2002, p. 21), they discussed their 
ideas and visions on the political future of their empire in a very bourgeois manner: 
newspapers, periodicals, theatres, coffee houses, novels, etc. From the 1840s onwards, 
the display of a certain lifestyle, until then unknown or at least not very common in 
the empire: with a certain understanding of the world, the right moral behavior, the 
values to be followed and even the proper way to dress, to reside and spend leisure 
time, did not differ so much from their European counterparts in London, Paris or 
Berlin (Mestyan, 2019, p. 209; Motadel, 2019, p. 234).
For this “bourgeois universe of values,” education obviously played a crucial role 
since it was regarded as being the main means to progress, personal achievement, 
self-perfection, and an individual personality coupled with a certain understanding 
of religion, politics, and science (Dejung et al., 2019, p. 10). The scope of educational 
borrowings from Western Europe in the course of the political reform era known 
as Tanzimat, from 1839 onwards (Can, 2013), lay in the emergence of a bourgeoisie 
equipped with another epistemological background (Göcek, 1996, p. 124). This class 
had a strong commitment to the idea that, through education, the problems of the 
empire “ranging from those of economic and military competitiveness, to those relating 
manpower, social control, cultural identification, and political loyalty” could be solved, 
if not entirely, then at least in large parts (Fortna, 2002, p. 30).
The emergence of that new social class can be observed on the basis of societal 
transformation processes in the empire. The organizational structure of the Ottoman 
Empire got successively undermined, when one of its main pillars, namely the 
household, was deeply shaken by military and educational reforms. A particularly 
impressive expression of this is the destruction of the so-called Janissary corps in 
1826 through Sultan Mahmud II, representing an important shift in Ottoman state-
crafting towards a centralized state that was able to impose its rule directly without 
imperial state intermediaries. The Janissaries – elite infantry units dating back to 
the fourteenth century who formed the Ottoman Sultan’s household troops and 
bodyguards, and who were arguably the first modern standing army in Europe, having 
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developed from a military unit into an influential social and political power within the 
empire – understandably opposed the Sultan’s reforms. Bereaving these social agents 
of their power opened up space for new agents more willing to correspond with the 
modernizing and westernizing agenda of the Ottoman state.
By introducing Western-style schools, adopting Western furniture and receiving 
Western literature and arts, living spaces were transformed and so was the social 
space, identities, and hierarchies within the “imperial family”. The symbols of power, 
recognition, and respect reflected this transformation explicitly since they also 
underwent an adjustment. An example of this is, that for centuries socialization and 
public display of wealth had occurred in the two stream valleys on the Bosphorus. In 
the course of the nineteenth century this changed in favor of the Pera district – a place 
inhabited mostly by Ottoman Christians who now set the tone for the latest fashion 
deriving from France (Quataert, 2005, p. 155).
Educational policies of the Ottoman state also displayed the shift from an imperial, 
family-based self-image to a more national, modern state centered self-understanding. 
Once begun with the destruction of the Janissaries the household was also removed 
from the “locus of education” in favour of an increasingly centralized and standardized 
modern state, thus firstly separating family from state, and secondly demonstrating 
the primacy of the state (Fortna, 2002, p.234). Here too, best practices and borrowed 
policies played a crucial role: Ottoman educational efforts began mostly as a reaction 
to the well-established schooling systems of Ottoman minorities and missionaries 
growing rapidly in number after the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856. The Ministry of 
Education was founded in 1857, but real progress towards a more systematized and 
state-centered primary schooling system was only achieved through the Education 
Rescript of 1869 (Evered, 2012, p. 1). The French education minister, Victor Duruy, 
mainly counselled the Ottoman government in 1867 (Somel, 2001, p. 86), hence the 
Ottomans more or less copied the French curriculum, even though in the course of 
the implementation process, many local adaptations occurred (Cicek, 2012, p. 225). 
Through such a school system, Ottoman officials sought to create a connecting 
Ottoman identity under their dangerously diverging population (Evered, 2012, p. 2). 
But the statement of an Ottoman physician in the 1920s underscores that modern 
schooling had had another, completely unintended effect, namely the emergence of 
separate national identities:
We saw that a Circassian club had opened in our neighborhood. Then an 
Albanian association was formed. Soon after, an Arab philanthropic society 
appeared! [...] Circassians wanted their freedom, as did the Albanians. The 
members of all these clubs were graduates of our own schools. [...] Hence the 
Bulgarian [...] Albanian [...] Arab independence movements were all manned 
by those reared and educated in our country, our schools.  (Nur, 1927/1967, p. 
268; transl. KM)
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The case of the Habsburg Empire
Like in the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire and its developing bureaucracy 
from the eighteenth century on, were dependent on the approval of and cooperation 
with the social, political, and economic elites, usually the bourgeois middle and upper 
classes. Often, well-educated members of these social classes served as clerks and officers 
in the various regions of the empire. Social prestige, economic wealth, and personal 
acquaintances with other important members of society played a major role in one’s 
career. Also important were one’s loyalty and devotion to the House of Habsburg, 
not necessarily one’s origins. Many contemporaries referred to the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as a golden age of humankind for those who enjoyed economic 
wealth and political freedom in the Habsburg Empire, as Stefan Zweig (1881–1942) 
mentions in his autobiography “The World of Yesterday” (1985). Emphasis was laid 
on one’s merit, but rarely on one’s nationality, since the concept of nation was rather 
young (it had started to emerge only at the end of the eighteenth century) and was 
only beginning to spread amongst the inhabitants of the empire.
The educational system as well as other aspects of social and public life in the 
Habsburg Empire were characterized by the neo-absolutism of Emperor Franz Joseph 
in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1848-49. Franz Joseph was not willing to accept 
various peoples’ claims for more rights. One could argue that the role of the emperor 
was so dominant that it overlaid the national ambitions of the empire’s ethnicities. Franz 
Joseph had become a symbol of Habsburg rule and secured his peoples’ loyalty. Here, 
the relationship between the old empires and the succeeding nation-states becomes 
quite clear. Therefore, it is time to think about when and how the concept of nation 
came into play and united with the state, leading to the predominant concept of the 
nation-state.
In 1882, Ernest Renan asked in his famous talk about “What is a nation?” why Austria 
is a state, but not a nation (Renan, 1882, p. 10). Almost 140 years later, we can read in 
the opening line of an article published by the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation, 
“nobody would argue that Austria is a ‘culture-nation’” (Baryani, 2020; transl. FG). In 
contrast, in 1996, Austria’s 1000th birthday was celebrated: postage stamps were printed, 
anniversary coins sold and the like, but in fact, one can hardly say that Austria has 
existed since 996, the year the name Austria (Ostarrichi) was mentioned in a written 
document for the first time. One cannot help but consider that the celebrations were 
invented for tradition (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Anderson, 1983). Obviously, in the 
times of the huge multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-denominational Habsburg 
Empire, Austria was hardly considered a unified nation, whereas nowadays, the concept 
of an Austrian nation seems so self-evident that it is hardly ever questioned. But the 
“Austrians” self-assurance of being their own distinctive nation required hard work. 
So how did that happen?
If Austria is a nation(-state), there must be something like an awareness of having an 
Austrian nationality (as a cultural thesis of a “we”) amongst the inhabitants of Austria. 
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Indeed, we can see that, back in the long nineteenth century, the term Austria(n) was 
mainly used by the administration for the non-Hungarian half of the empire (another 
name was Cisleithania, deriving from the river Leitha, which delineated the border 
between the west of the Kingdom of Hungary and the rest of the Austro-Hungarian 
Dual-Monarchy). One must not confuse the term Austria of 1918 and afterwards with 
what this term stood for before 1918. The term “Austria” was used for all territories 
of the Habsburg Monarchy except for Hungary. For example, the constitution of 
1867 contained a bill of rights for the citizen and granted Austrian citizenship to all 
inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire except for the Kingdom of Hungary which gave 
its inhabitants Hungarian Citizenship. Austrian citizens could be Ukrainians from 
Lviv, Czechs from Prague or Croats from the south of the empire. Neither language 
nor ethnicity tied them together, but their citizenship and belonging to the Habsburg 
Monarchy did. In the core of the monarchy lay what would later be Austria, and the 
question is: People in the monarchy considered themselves Austrian citizens, but 
did they consider themselves part of a particular nation? Most interestingly, they 
barely considered themselves national Austrians, instead they thought of themselves 
as Germans, not only during the monarchy, but also afterwards when the Republic 
of German-Austria was founded in 1918 and renamed as Republic of Austria in the 
wake of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1919. A geography textbook used in 
middle schools during the monarchy can illustrate an example of this. Here, we can 
read the following on Austria-Hungary: “The population is mixed and consists of 
Germans, Slavs […] Magyars and Romances” (Weingartner, 1918, p. 52; transl. FG). 
The Austrian lands/duchies are presented one after another: “1. The Archduchy of 
Austria below the Enns [...] counts 2 million people. [...] The population is German. 
2. The Archduchy of Austria above the Enns [...] Population German. 3. The Duchy of 
Salzburg [...] Population German” (Weingartner, 1918, p. 52; transl. FG). This feeling 
of being German and belonging to the German people and nation continued after the 
dissolution of the monarchy. A textbook for fatherland studies (Vaterlandskunde) from 
1923 presents the population of the Republic of Austria as such: “With the exception 
of Burgenland and of Carinthia, the population of all federal states is more than 95% 
German, so they are mere German settlement areas” (Goll, 1923, p. 38; transl. FG).
One could ask why the Austrians call themselves Germans, and why the orientation 
of the inhabitants of the later Austrian Republic had not changed when politics made a 
sharp turn from the Habsburg monarchy to democracy. After the First World War, very 
strict laws on the nobility and the House of Habsburg were applied: titles of nobility 
were abolished, the Habsburgs lost all their properties, and had to leave the country: 
the Emperor and his family returned to Switzerland in March 1919 after more than 
650 years of Habsburg rule. The new republic did not hesitate to make new laws and a 
new constitution, but – surprisingly or not – this hardly affected the sphere of school 
and education. As we could see above, children attending school in 1923 read in their 
textbooks that ethnic Germans inhabited their homeland, just as they learnt before 
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1918. They now lived in Austria, but they were taught to consider themselves nationally 
as Germans, just like their ancestors. Furthermore, in fatherland studies, children not 
only learned that in their new homeland of Austria lived the Germans of the former 
Habsburg Empire, but that they also had to leave behind their German kinsmen who 
were not allowed to join a German state and now lived in other successor countries of 
the former Habsburg Empire (e.g. Hungary, Czechoslovakia). Consequently, we can read 
in the previously cited textbook for fatherland studies: “While German-Austria received 
only 5,787.193, that is more than the half of the Germans of Old Austria, the nation-
states received 4,163.461 Germans of the old state” (Goll, 1923, pp. 38-39; transl. FG).
What had gone wrong here? Or rather, why did the newly founded Austria not 
act like other nation-states and emphasize stronger ideas of national identity when, 
during the long nineteenth century, they gave themselves constitutions and then 
consistently enacted new school legislation in order to implement their ideas of 
identity and social order inherent in the constitutions? The reason for this is that the 
concept of an independent Austrian nation-state was promoted as a model by the 
Allies in general and France in particular, and it aimed at weakening the German-
speaking area in Europe. The Republic of German-Austria, in 1918, had been founded 
by the German-speaking representatives of the former parliament (Reichsrath), but 
was renamed as Republic of Austria, after the Allies had prohibited the unification 
of Austria with Germany. By that time, the Allies applied, or better, enforced, their 
pattern of a nation-state on a territory that had never been designed to be a distinct 
nation, let alone a nation-state. Austria was now forced to consider itself as a nation-
state, but, unfortunately, Austrians themselves did not know about that. In contrast, 
they struggled for unification with Germany from the moment the monarchy ceased 
to exist, calling their new homeland, which they considered part of the new Germany, 
in 1918, German-Austria (Deutschösterreich). At first, nobody really seemed to care 
about that, but when the negotiations in Paris started in 1919, the Allies made their 
point clear and the delegates of German-Austria had to change the country’s name to 
Austria or face the threat of occupation. German-Austria took the order and changed 
its constitution and its name. Austria was created, but lacked Austrians, who now had 
to be made basically out of nothing (distinct).
To make Austrians loyal to the new nation-state meant, first, a genuine Austrian 
identity would be necessary, a vision of what makes Austrians unique. But this vision 
did not exist in particular as a fitting model of a sovereign democratic Austria in its 
shape from 1918 onwards. Neither school nor politics nor elites tried to create an ideal 
vision of an Austrian society within the forced political borders of Austria. Austrian 
politicians and people rather blamed the Allies for tearing apart the German people 
and the German nation by enforcing an Austrian state that should understand itself 
as a nation-state. While the Germans in the other successor states of the Habsburg 
empire kept their feeling of belonging to the German nation, like the Sudeten Germans 
(Sudetendeutsche) – who ironically had in fact belonged to the Austrian monarchy, but 
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were “taken home” into the Third Reich, to which they had never belonged, in 1938, – 
this was no long term option for the Austrian Germans. We only see a slight change in 
the attitude towards the Republic of Austria as a nation-state by the end of the 1920s 
and even stronger from the beginning of the 1930s on, when – in a comparative view – 
a large part of the former Ottoman Empire had already been turned into the Republic 
of Turkey by a nationalist movement. In the Republic of Austria, a similar nationalist 
movement did not exist at that time. It can be presumed that the developing dictatorship 
of chancellor Dollfuß was the first extensive attempt to create a genuine Austrian identity 
distinct from the German Empire and the Third Reich later on. His attempt was still 
based on the German-ness of Austrians, but it was a superior German-ness mainly 
based on culture (Buchmann, 2019, pp. 159-160). Unlike the main successor of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic as the Turkish nation-state, the First Republic 
of Austria lacked a genuine, distinct new epistemology, but was trapped between the 
glory of the Habsburg Empire and the claim of being German on the one hand, and 
the new republic’s self-consciousness and forced sovereignty on the other hand.
Conclusion
As we can see, nationalism and the idea of the nation-state faced the Ottoman and 
Habsburg Empires with various challenges throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Despite all that the two empires had in common, their social stratification 
and political self-images differed largely from each other. Whereas the Habsburg Empire 
had already an aristocratic and bourgeois elite and an existing schooling system since 
Maria-Theresia embedded it in the existing imperial system, the Ottoman Empire did 
not consist of social classes but organized itself instead in households comprising the 
vast range of social classes. Its religious heterogeneity was organized according to the 
millet system, granting the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek millets a semi-autonomous 
status on its territory, thereby balancing ethnic, linguistic, and cultural affiliations 
by religious alignment. Education in the Ottoman Empire was not regarded as a 
field to be interfered by the state, thus it was left, in the case of its minorities, to the 
millets themselves, to the private education within the households, or to the religious 
establishments that had already developed religious educational schooling, known as a 
madrasa system. But things changed dramatically for the Ottomans when the ideology 
of nationalism literally gained ground on its territory after stemming from the Balkans. 
In contrast to the elites of the Habsburg Empire, who regarded themselves as German, 
the Ottoman officials did not have an understanding of themselves as a specific nation. 
Indeed, the Ottoman state had been through and through „anational“ (Karpat, 2001, p. 
286). The active demarcations of their minorities as distinguished peoples, forced the 
otherwise a-national Ottoman state into the search for a common identity, capable of 
stopping the erosion of the Empire. A centralized schooling system based on the model 
of France was regarded as the best means to establish „Ottomanism“ and harmonize 
the ethnic unrest within the empire. But since Ottomanism could not really refer to 
existing and established identities, like religious, ethnic, or linguistic ones, and since 
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the Great Powers championed the secession claims of Ottoman minorities due to their 
imperial interests, the way was soon paved for Turkish nationalism.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire, on the other hand, quite early experienced the 
power of nationalism and what it meant for a multi-ethnic empire to suffer from inner 
friction between several nationalities in the process of their creation. Nevertheless, the 
elites of the empire lacked the will for and the vision of a genuine Austrian identity 
that would have been different from their German neighbors. They missed the train, 
while many other states in Europe started to link their institutions and people with 
the nation according to the French „winning“ model. It then turned out to be too late 
for them, when the German-minded core of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was 
catapulted into the Age of Nation-states after the First World War.
These two examples have explained how different the ways of dealing with new ideas 
in the „same“ context of a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual empire could develop. After 
the First World War, both empires were to be reduced to a minimal torso. But whereas 
the Habsburg Empire was politically forced to – although unsuccessfully – adjust 
itself to the idea of a nation, the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 fueled Ottoman resistance 
and led to a war for independence against the allies that culminated in the emergence 
of the Turkish republic. Therefore, both cases elucidate how the travel of a specific 
Western European idea, namely that of the nation-state, occurred either by imposing it 
forcefully or, as the Ottoman case shows, by political and institutional borrowings that, 
within a century, successively changed an imperial elite into a national one by means 
of a centralized and standardized schooling system. The „long nineteenth century“ 
began with the transformation of the French Ancien Régime to the French nation-
state and ended with the establishment of the nation-state as the predominant model 
of governance in Europe and beyond. Heterogeneous empire-states with centuries old 
experience in governing diversity could not assert themselves against the French-made 
political formation of a nation-state. The twentieth century has undoubtedly marked 
the sidereal hour of the French nation-state, which has been exported and imported 
– forcefully and willingly –, changed, adjusted, modified, and altered according to 
local contexts. Nevertheless, newer research on „state-nations“ more able to cope with 
diversity, ambiguity, and hybrid identities (Stepan et al., 2010) render the imperial 
model from a discontinued one to a very up-to-date model worth digging deeper into. 
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Činjenje nacije u carstvima: 
pojava Turske i Austrije
Sažetak
U ovom članku ispituje se izgrađivanje nacije u vezi s obrazovanjem i obrazovnim 
institucijama, na primjeru dva bivša velika aktera u europskoj politici nakon 
Prvog svjetskog rata: Otomanskog Carstvu i Habsburškog Carstva. Habsburško 
Carstvo promatra se prvenstveno kroz poseban fokus na udžbenike u 1918. godini 
i periodu nakon nje, uspoređujući ih međusobno i razumijevajući ih kao glavne 
alate širenja nacionalnih ideja unutar državnih škola. Kako će biti pokazano, ideja 
austrijske nacije u smislu ideologije nacionalne države teško se može naći, kako 
prije, tako i neposredno nakon sloma 1918. godine. S druge strane, Otomansko 
Carstvo ispituje se kao primjer činjenja nacije u procesu transformacije društvenih 
struktura unutar ne-zapadnih društava, kroz škole zapadnjačkoga stila te stoga 
doprinosi nacionalnom ostvarenju Republike Turske. U ovom članku istražuju se 
imperijalne osnove ove dvije nacionalne države i način na koji su se one i prijašnja 
carstva bavili modernim konceptom nacije i nacionalizma.
Ključne riječi: Austrija; Habsburško Carstvo; izgradnja nacije; Otomansko Carstvo; 
Turska.
